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Blurry Shadows

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Types of questions we will consider:

Do we have "free will"?

Can we know anything?

Is there a "soul"?

What does it mean to say, "something is wrong."?

Does God exist?

Is science possible or elusive?

What can be known apart from experience?

Are there metaphysical truths?

In this course, we will:

  • Find definitions for "philosophy"

  • Learn to read philosophical papers

  • Take a tour of the major fields of philosophy

  • Read foundational or important texts from major contributors in each of those fields

  • Come to understand the general camps in each of these conversations and how they respond to one another

  • Get an idea of the major questions with which philosophy still wrestles and upon which it sheds light and brings clarity

  • Become familiar with important concepts developed by philosophers which are used to navigate these difficult topics

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

How this course relates to other courses:
General Philosophy Curriculum
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Winding Roads

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

How this course relates to other courses:
With the Rest of the Map

Epistemology

Intro to Academic Philosophy

Religion

Mind

Ethics

Metaphysics

Decoding Zarathustra

Common Sense - James and Reid

Fear and Trembling Kierkegaard

Dreaming with Jung

Wrestling with Peterson

Plantinga and Bonjour

Complete History of Western Thought

Writings of Plato

Meditating With Descartes

Prolegomena to metaphysics

Incoherence

Theologizing with Aquinas

Contemporary Philosophical Discussions

Y1

Y2

Y3

Y4

Core Curriculum

Year One

Formal Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Philosophy of Mind

Philosophy of

Religion

Epistemology

Metaphysics

Ethics

Entire Undergraduate Philosophy Major

​

Does NOT count as one of the three branches necessary for a full interdisciplinary degree.

​

All or Part of this collection provides the foundational understanding necessary for any three branches.

​

One of those branches can be a further philosophical pursuit, but does not have to be

Winding Road

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Required Readings
Monthly Book Club

Easy-to-read, popular, philosophical works will be provided in this sidebar as we go, read one of your choice from each section per month.

Other Sources

We will be supplementing with other readings which will be provided on this page or in links to free sources.

Further Readings

If you find yourself particularly interested in a specific subject, a bibliography will be given for further exploration.

Winding Road

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Class Calendar & Requirements
  1. One Month on: Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility​

    1. Read All 11 Essays/Excerpts​; take notes and study

    2. Read/Watch all 11 Lectures

    3. Read one book this month from the supplementary reading list for this section

  2. One Month on: Scepticism and the Problem of Induction

    1. Read all 7 Essays/Excerpts​

    2. Read/Watch all 7 Lectures

    3. Read one book this month from the supplementary reading list for this section

  3. One Month on: Body, Mind, and Death

    1. Read All 11 Essays/Excerpts​

    2. Read/Watch all 11 Lectures

    3. Read one book this month from the supplementary reading list for this section

  4. One Month on: Moral Judgments

    1. Read All 10 Essays/Excerpts​

    2. Read/Watch all 10 Lectures

    3. Read one book this month from the supplementary reading list for this section

  5. One Month on: The Existence of God

    1. Read All 17 Essays/Excerpts​

    2. Read/Watch all 17 Lectures

    3. Read one book this month from the supplementary reading list for this section

  6. One Month on: Perception and the Physical World

    1. Read All 10 Essays/Excerpts​

    2. Read/Watch all 10 Lectures

    3. Read one book this month from the supplementary reading list for this section

  7. One Month on: A Priori Knowledge

    1. Read All 9 Essays/Excerpts​

    2. Read/Watch all 9 Lectures

    3. Read one book this month from the supplementary reading list for this section

  8. One Month on: Meaning, Verification, and Metaphysics

    1. Read All 8 Essays/Excerpts​

    2. Read/Watch all 8 Lectures

    3. Read one book this month from the supplementary reading list for this section

Throughout the 8 Month Course: Find one author, or one book, or one lecture, or one essay, or one idea, or one argument, or one camp of thought; AND write one essay of any length on that one thing you've chosen to be added to the website for the benefit of future students who take this class.

River
Sunset

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Detemins, Freedm, and Mora Responsbility
River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Introduction with Paul Edwards

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Read one of these books this month OR select a book for this month from one of the collection collections given in the next sections:  23, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10

Paul Edwards Intro Determinism
River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Introduction with Paul Edwards

Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

He read Darwin, Lamarck, and Schopenhauer.

He shared a belief with Lamarck that acquired characteristics could be passed down in heredity.

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He was a contemporary of Nietzsche's; their friendship may have fallen apart due to having a mutual love interest in another great thinker, Lou Andreas-Salomé.

He wrote on the origin of moral sentiments, a book which Nietzsche kindly disagreed with in almost every line.

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He looked for natural explanations for moral sentiments, and rejected metaphysical approaches to morality.

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Monthly Readings
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Content and Consciousness Daniel Dennett BOOK.jpg
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Read one of these books this month OR select a book for this month from one of the collection collections given in the next sections:  3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10

Pau Ree
Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Link to PFF of the first English translations of The Origin of the Moral Sensations and Psychological Observations, the two most important works by the German philosopher Paul Rée. 

Basic Writings.jpg

Section 1: Nothing Happens without a Cause

Summation:

   Determinism means: While many events can happen potentially; only those events whose causes are sufficient to make them happen ever occur, and the only things which occur are those whose sufficient causes have manifested.

​

   We agree that the physical world is deterministic. The behaviors of animals are different from the behaviors of stones or protons or colliding objects on an inclined plane; these behaviors are based on desire--psychological realities.

​

   However, those psychological realities, while qualitatively distinct from physical phenomena in many ways, are also deterministic. (The donkey will want to walk this way 0r that way if and only if the causes sufficient to make it want to do so are present.)

​

   Axiomatically: everything which happens has a cause.

 

   Our observations confirm that this rule applies to the behaviors--and the necessary desires in that chain of causation--of animals.

​

   Why should it be otherwise?

​

   The confusion comes from the fact that the physical causes of physical events are available to our observation; while the causes of desire and choice are internal to the mind of the creature doing the choosing and ultimately the acting and so they are invisible to us; but they must exist in the causal nexus of the world which always and everywhere follows this Universal law of Necessity.

 

   Furthermore, the factors which go into the making of a decision for an animal are rarely conscious factors in the mind of the animal, they are invisible to the actor himself what causes are sufficient to make him want and then to choose one course of action over another. Yet they must be there, and be sufficient to cause the animal to make whatever choice it makes.

​

   It seems that things which do not happen are possible nonetheless, and this is true in a sense. it is NOT possible for a donkey to fly, but it WAS possible that he turned to the left instead of the right as we observed him to do. HOWEVER, what we mean when we say this is only that the factors which made him turn to the right were so trivial, and could easily be imagined to have been other than they were, that it is easy for us to imagine them having been different so that they would have caused him to turn in the other direction. The truth is that they were what they were, and being physical and external to the donkey, could not have been otherwise, as the whole of the physical world is subject to this Universal law of determinism, so in reality the donkey had no chance of ever turning the other way, and we would see that if we knew all the causes and understood them fully.

​

In Short: The life of an animal and all its choices are determined by its genetic make-up, and the history of its environmental past and present and nothing else. The only alternative is that the donkey is a divine first-mover sometimes when it acts, and this goes against our understanding of the world and a Universal Principle of Necessary Cause.

Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Link to PFF of the first English translations of The Origin of the Moral Sensations and Psychological Observations, the two most important works by the German philosopher Paul Rée. 

Basic Writings.jpg

Section 2: Human Beings and the Law of Causality

Summation:

The same with man applies.

"Man's every feeling is a necessary result."

There is always a cause behind whatever psychological state motivates my feelings or actions.

causes resulted in my eventual birth in time with the particular qualities which define my character and personality, causes in the physical universe account for all the things that happened to me in my life to shape this raw material into what it is now. Sufficient causes make this shaped character feel the way it does now and account for the decisions I might make.

"Inborn characteristics" are the result of a series of sufficient causes, and so do not transcend this Universal rule of cause and effect.

All the thoughts you have, the trivial and the significant, the wrong and the correct, are the results of causes sufficient to make them manifest, and so there is no freedom of thought, either.

If you are inclined to disagree with this, it is because sufficient causes to make you inclined to be wrong on this issue account for why you feel this way.

"Actions" are just the externalization of sensations and thoughts, so they are also as much the result of determined causes as those thoughts and sensations are, which we already affirm as totally caused in this way.

The subjective causes behind a man's motivations are the state of his liver, the particulars of the way he was constituted genetically and shaped historically, the imagined consequences of his considered behaviors, etc. The objective causes have to do with the proximity of other persons or objects, the temperature around him, the noise-level of the wind, etc.

"For man, as well as for animal and stone, there are at any moment innumerably many potential states." whichever of these potentialities takes place MUST have had the sufficient causes present in the world to make it be the one which takes place, and nothing else could have taken place.

Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Link to PFF of the first English translations of The Origin of the Moral Sensations and Psychological Observations, the two most important works by the German philosopher Paul Rée. 

Basic Writings.jpg

Section 3: Determinism and Will-Power

Summation:

   Will-Power, rightly understood, is not a prime-mover force in the world acting as the first cause of a unique action liberated from a deterministic framework. It is instead sometimes the explanation for a specific action only insomuch as it is remembered that the will-power itself originated from causes sufficient to make it exist and act as a cause of something else.

   "Wanting" is just the same as this.

There is no use protesting that we cannot be in a deterministic world because you have the freedom to choose to make a noise or raise an appendage to prove that what you will is what happens, because that will of yours is still determined to be what it is by the biological physical psychological realities of your make-up and your environment together.

Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Link to PFF of the first English translations of The Origin of the Moral Sensations and Psychological Observations, the two most important works by the German philosopher Paul Rée. 

Basic Writings.jpg

Class on Sections 1-3

Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Link to PFF of the first English translations of The Origin of the Moral Sensations and Psychological Observations, the two most important works by the German philosopher Paul Rée. 

Basic Writings.jpg

Section 4: Ignorance of the Causation of Our Actions

Summation:

   Even though it is true, what I have said, that all our actions are determined by whatever the state of the Universe was 1 second after the Big Bang, it seems as though our actions are undetermined--that we are free to act however we may. To what are we to look for an explanation of this impression, this illusion of freedom?

   The answer is that we are not aware of the causes of our desires, our wills, and so we presume they come from nowhere and are an explanation in themselves.

   Because we know not the causes of our behaviors, we imagine they could have been otherwise than they were, and so we have this illusion of freedom.

   We can see that the illusion of freedom emerges in this way (in the way of being our assumption due to our lack of knowledge regarding the causal factors which are behind our actions) by looking at when we use this phrase: "I could have done otherwise". We use it to refer to things where we know the least about what went into our actions. "I picked up the egg on the left instead of the right but I might have done the opposite" we never say: "I picked up the egg on the left instead of murdering my neighbor. We know enough about our motivations and the realities in the world which bring them about to keep us from feeling inclined to think we would commit a murder, but we do not know if the other egg was slightly closer, or looked a little better in the light, or whatever else went into why we chose the left egg over the right."

   Your motivations are the cause of your actions, but they are themselves caused.

   In trivial matters, then, the illusion of freedom (of, "being able to have done otherwise") comes from not having access to the factors that went into determining our desires and choices. In serious matters, it is different. In serious matters we are aware of the differing forces which go into our choices, BUT we are still ignorant to the way in which each one weighs against and wars against the others so that the ultimate outcome still seems to us to emerge from nothing but the choice we made, when in reality, the various weights of the different inclinations worked out the way they had to at that time in that place and so they fully account for why we chose what we chose and they determined that choice.

   Because we do not see the causes of our desires; sometimes at all, and sometimes only incompletely, our choices seem free to us.

Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Link to PFF of the first English translations of The Origin of the Moral Sensations and Psychological Observations, the two most important works by the German philosopher Paul Rée. 

Basic Writings.jpg

Section 5: Determinism is Inconsistent with Judgments of Moral Responsibility

Summation:

   Paul: The conclusion is obvious. Most people don't think about this, but of those few of us who do, most come to the conclusions that the ultimate causation of an individual's actions are outside themselves, and so it is inappropriate and philosophically in error to say that someone should be punished for whatever they have done--or praised, for that matter.

   However, all is not lost. Strictly speaking "Blame" and "Merit" should become nonsense words to us. However, we may still find some actions (like, "helping the needy") as agreeable, and other actions (like, "murder") as disagreeable. We may even say: "I admire that individual and wish I was more like him for I am impressed by his behaviors in these circumstances." Perhaps we can even say: "it is good that we punish the murderer as a deterrent to weigh in the minds of other would-be murderers that they might take our punishment into account when the various motivations which determine their actions are being weighed.

   None of this is nonsense. But, strictly speaking, people do what they are determined to do.

Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Link to PFF of the first English translations of The Origin of the Moral Sensations and Psychological Observations, the two most important works by the German philosopher Paul Rée. 

Basic Writings.jpg

Section 6: Can We Abandon Judgments of Moral Responsibility?

Summation:

   It is impossible to assign blame or merit to effects, and the actions of all men are always effects of events stretching back into the infinite past and ultimately external to the man himself. However, our habit of assigning blame or merit to certain actions is strong and would be difficult to break, especially considering the fact that a man calculates that it will bring him less happiness to do so. However, we can pit habit against habit, and perhaps break the chain of connecting merit and blame to actions if every time we find ourselves doing so we remind ourselves of the simple truths listed above, that this is an unreasonable thing to do. Through this habit we may be able to break the other.

Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Link to PFF of the first English translations of The Origin of the Moral Sensations and Psychological Observations, the two most important works by the German philosopher Paul Rée. 

Basic Writings.jpg

Discussion Questions

  • Paul does not argue that everything in the world is subject to the law of causality; he assumes it, and then he goes on to demonstrate that this law also applies to the making of our decisions.

    • Is this assumption just a prejudice?​

    • if not: Is there any other way of thinking about the Universe, or is Paul just being consistent with the only coherent way of making sense of anything?

    • if not: Who says the Universe has to be comprehensible to us? surely we must assume it is if we are going to engage in philosophical inquiry, otherwise there would be no way of justifying trying to understand it in the first place, BUT why can we not ask if this is all futile because we are forced to be in error that the Universe is comprehensible whenever we try to understand it, but we have no reason to think that it is.

Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Link to PFF of the first English translations of The Origin of the Moral Sensations and Psychological Observations, the two most important works by the German philosopher Paul Rée. 

Basic Writings.jpg

Famous Philosophical Question (Buridan's ass):

   Imagine a donkey perfectly positioned between two identical bales of hay. The donkey is starving to death. However, the "principle of sufficient reason" is one of the oldest and most consistently adhered-to thought rules in philosophy. Because the bales are identical and perfectly placed the same distance from the donkey and from his sensory organs, the donkey has no reason to prefer turning to the left or turning to the right. Therefore, the donkey will starve to death.

Stacked Wooden Logs

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Paul Rée: Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Paul Ree.jpg

Paul Rée

Determinism and the Illusion of Moral Responsibility

Link to PFF of the first English translations of The Origin of the Moral Sensations and Psychological Observations, the two most important works by the German philosopher Paul Rée. 

Basic Writings.jpg

Class on Sections 4-6

Countryside Road

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Henry Thomas Buckle: The Regularity of the Moral World

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Henry Thomas Buckle

The Regularity of the Moral World

Link to downloadable PDF of "History of Civilization in England"

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Sometimes called "The Father of Scientific History"

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An Accomplished Chess Player

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He grew up reading these.

Links to full texts

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Monthly Readings
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Read one of these books this month OR select a book for this month from one of the collection collections given in the other sections:  2,     4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10

Henry Bucle Determnism
Countryside Road

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Henry Thomas Buckle: The Regularity of the Moral World

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Henry Thomas Buckle

The Regularity of the Moral World

Link to downloadable PDF of "History of Civilization in England"

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Summation:

   I agree with Paul. If I knew all the circumstances surrounding an historical figure, and fully understood his mental states, I should be able to accurately predict exactly what he will do in history. Therefore, if we predict wrongly, our story is incomplete and we must look for new information regarding his circumstances or his inclinations.

   If we could mathematize all of this, then we would really be getting somewhere!

   If we could measure the regularity, year by year, of death by disease in a city, we would have a number indicating how much fluctuation exists as a result of the many complicated factors collectively govern the instances of disease and death. BUT we can do this, and have.

   Now, imagine we were to do the SAME THING with a kind of human behavior--say, murder. We could see how much fluctuation there were in murders in a certain city. BUT WE HAVE done this, too. Perhaps you will be surprised to find that the REGULARITY of the second contains LESS fluctuation than the first!

   Because of this, I feel that human behavior can be quantified, in principle; and that history should be done in this way so that we can plug in numbers to various factors and successfully predict the behaviors of humans.

   Because the increase or decrease of suicides in a society is predictable based on the struggles to which the members of that society are subjected year by year, "the offenses of men are the result not so much of the vices of the individual offender as of that state of society into which that individual is thrown."

   "the great social law, that the moral actions of men are the product not of their volition, but of their antecedents, is itself liable to disturbances which trouble its operation without affecting its truth."

   "To those who have a steady conception of the regularity of events, and have firmly seized the great truth that the actions of men, being guided by their antecedents, are in reality never inconsistent, but, however capricious they may appear, only form part of one vast scheme of universal order, of which we in the present state of knowledge can barely see the outline,--to those who understand this, which is at once the key and the basis of history, the facts just adduced, so far from being strange, will be precisely what would have been expected, and ought long since to have been known. Indeed, the progress of inquiry is becoming so rapid and so earnest, that I entertain little doubt that before another century has elapsed, the chain of evidence will be complete, and it will be as rare to find an historian who denies the undeviating regularity of the moral world, as it now is to find a philosopher who denies the regularity of the material world"

Countryside Road

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Henry Thomas Buckle: The Regularity of the Moral World

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Henry Thomas Buckle

The Regularity of the Moral World

Link to downloadable PDF of "History of Civilization in England"

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Bridge Over River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Monthly Readings
Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

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William James

The Dilemma of Determinism

Link to downloadable PDF of "The Dilemma of Determinism"

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Father of American Psychology

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With Charles Sanders Pierce (below), he established a philosophical school of thought known as "Pragmatism"

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The Pragmatic Maxim:

Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.

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Read one of these books this month OR select a book for this month from one of the collection collections given in the other sections:  2, 3,     5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10

Countryside Road

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Henry Thomas Buckle: The Regularity of the Moral World

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Henry Thomas Buckle

The Regularity of the Moral World

Link to downloadable PDF of "History of Civilization in England"

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WilliamJames Determinis
Bridge Over River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

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William James

The Dilemma of Determinism

Link to downloadable PDF of "The Dilemma of Determinism"

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William James -- READINGS W/ COMMENTARY

Bridge Over River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

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William James

The Dilemma of Determinism

Link to downloadable PDF of "The Dilemma of Determinism"

dilemma of determinism.jpg

Rationality and the Free-Will Controversy

Summation:

   We must always maintain doubt. If we have a demonstration that free-will is true, then we would force ourselves to believe it, and therefore not be free anymore.

   We cannot accept the idea of free-will unless we are capable of rejecting it.

​

I have two suppositions which underpin what I am about to argue:

  1. When we make theories about the world and discuss them with one another, we do so in order to attain a conception of things which shall give us subjective satisfaction

  2. If there be two conceptions, and the one seems to us, on the whole, more rational than the other, we are entitled to suppose that the more rational one is truer of the two.

 

   "Our only way to understand the world better is to try." (thought and investigation conceptualized as action).

   "I, for one, feel as free to try conceptions of moral as of mechanical or of logical rationality."

   If a certain formula for expressing the nature of the world violates my moral demand, I shall feel free to throw it overboard, or at least to doubt it, as if it disappointed my demand for uniformity of sequence, for example; the one demand being, so far as I can see, quite as subjective and emotional as the other is.

​

The commitments of Paul and Buckley and the like are as much "alters to unknown gods" as any commitment to freedom from moral necessity.

​

Furthermore, the compatibilists have obfuscated the word "freedom" as badly as the hard-core determinists have.

​

The causationists, the statisticians, the hard determinists--those who believe in fatality, necessity, or even predetermination--as well as the "free-will determinists"... all these have confused the meanings of "chance" and of "freedom" so much so that I will not even talk about "freedom." But, instead, let us talk about determinism.

Bridge Over River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

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William James

The Dilemma of Determinism

Link to downloadable PDF of "The Dilemma of Determinism"

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Possibilities and Actualities

Summation:

   Looking into the facts around us to find an argument for determinism against indeterminism OR for indeterminism against determinism is impossible. This is because: 

   Determinism claims: The totality of the facts of the state of the Universe at any time DETERMINE what the future states of the Universe will be.

   Indeterminism claims: There are multiple real possibilities for the future, and the only thing that precludes the one is the fact that the other manifests, but it is not determined to be so and could have gone the other way. This is because there is some ambiguity in the parts that make up the whole Universe.

   Only one of these can be true.

   Determinism says: "possibilities" are actually impossible illusions unless they be the one necessary future. Indeterminism says: there are actual possibilities which exist in a real sense even though only a minority of them will become actualized.

   This applies to volitions. Determinists say: "a man wanted something at such-and-such a time". The indeterminist says: "he did, and we are pleased you admit so, but he could have wanted something else at that time. The determinist replies: "That second point of yours is nonsense because only what happens could have been.

   NOW we get to the crux of why external investigation cannot resolve this question between the two perspectives.

   SCIENCE claims that it says nothing except that which is based on demonstrable facts. How could ANY investigation into WHAT HAPPENED give us any insight into the nature (real or otherwise) of something which didn't happen? How can science settle the question of "are possibilities which do not come to be really possible at all?" if the only things it can consider are those which happened?

   What divides us into possibility men and anti-possibility men is different faiths or postulates--postulates of rationality. To this man the world seems more rational with possibilities in it--to that man more rational with possibilities excluded; and talk as we will about having to yield to evidence, what makes us monists or pluralists, determinists or indeterminists, is at bottom always some sentiment like this.

Bridge Over River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

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William James

The Dilemma of Determinism

Link to downloadable PDF of "The Dilemma of Determinism"

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The Idea of Chance

Summation:

   real possibilities == chance == chaos, unreason and insanity in the mind (in the personality) of the determinist

   There is another way to think about "chance":

   it is not a positive something which means preposterous irrationality... it is a purely negative and relative term meaning nothing more than "disconnected from necessity".

   However, it does have a positive connotation in that it, in this view, must BE A THING itself with its own reality. The whole Universe must wait for what chance will offer up to it.

   My view is NOT claiming that anything we can imagine as physically possible is equally likely to occur. Just that all the things which can tempt us to chose, are really possibilities we might choose.

   To this kind of indeterminism, choices == peculiar psychic facts which are independent form the natural flow of the rest of the Universe. It is a moment of partial authorship the agent has in the Universe.

   Determinism denies the ambiguity of future volitions, because it affirms that nothing future can be ambiguous. But we have said enough tot meet the issue. Indeterminate future volitions do mean chance. Let us not fear tot shout it from the house-tops if need be; for we now know that the idea of chance is, at bottom, exactly the same thing as the idea of gift--the one simply being a disparaging, and the other a eulogistic, name for anything on which we have no effective claim. And whether the world be the better or the worse for having either chances or gifts in it will depend altogether on what these uncertain and unclaimable things turn out to be.

Bridge Over River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

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William James

The Dilemma of Determinism

Link to downloadable PDF of "The Dilemma of Determinism"

dilemma of determinism.jpg
Bridge Over River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

Face.jpg

William James

The Dilemma of Determinism

Link to downloadable PDF of "The Dilemma of Determinism"

dilemma of determinism.jpg

The Moral Implications of Determinism

Summation:

   RECAP: indeterminism just means that there is an element of chance in the world and THIS means nothing more than that not everything is determined.

BUT we haven't proven that that is in fact the way the world is, just that it seems so.

WE HAVE TO REMEMBER that there is no way of proving either determinism nor indeterminism.

now that we have cleared the way, all we can do is this: look at the consequences of theorizing the world as deterministic vs. indeterministic.

How do we deal with regret.

​

From the Determinist perspective:

We find some things regrettable.

Some of these regrets are nearly impossible to avoid, truly terrible things we think it would be better in the world if they had not happened.

We can regard "regret" as a mistake, but we cannot avoid having it in some situations.

The problem, for the determinist course of thought is this: that action we find regrettable was necessary; the Universe as a whole demands that event. So, to find it inescapably regrettable is to lead logically to a conclusion that all is regrettable. It is "pessimistic" or "life-negating" (not his term)

The only other option is for the determinist to conclude that the regret, as unavoidable as it is, is rightly understood as itself an error. Nothing is regrettable, because everything is necessary.

The problem with this optimistic approach is that the "unavoidable regret" is then ITSELF something which it would be better if it didn't exist, but it necessarily must exist (as determinists affirm all things which are must be).

   There is a way out of this, for the determinists, obviously; and it may be occurring to you now. The determinist needs only find a way to affirm as good BOTH the murder and the regret for the murder.

Our only point here is to show that the Determinist position PUSHES you directly into the quagmire of the "problem of evil".

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Literary References Made in this Piece

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Bridge Over River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

Face.jpg

William James

The Dilemma of Determinism

Link to downloadable PDF of "The Dilemma of Determinism"

dilemma of determinism.jpg

Morality and Indeterminism

Summation:

   Our aspirations, regrets, excitements, motivations, all these things and more become nonsense in the previous view. What consequences are there for giving them up, and (since either view is unprovable) what reason do we have to give them up if they serve us?

   I cannot understand the willingness to act, no matter how we feel, without the belief that acts are really good and bad. I cannot understand the belief that na act is bad, without regret at its happening. I cannot understand regret without the admission of real, genuine possibilities in the world. Only then is it other than a mockery to feel, after we have failed to do our best, that an irreparable opportunity is gone from the universe, the loss of which it must forever after mourn.

   If you insist that this is all superstition, that possibility is in the eye of science and reason impossibility, and that if I act badly 'tis that the universe was foredoomed to suffer this defect, you fall right back into the dilemma, the labyrinth, of pessimism and subjectivism, from out of whose toils we have just wound our way.

   Now, we are of course free to fall back, if we please. For my own part, though, whatever difficulties may beset the philosophy of objective right and wrong, and the indeterminism it seems to imply, determinism, with its alternative pessimism and romanticism, contains difficulties that are greater still. But you will remember that I expressly repudiated awhile ago the pretension to offer any arguments which could be coercive in a so-called scientific fashion in this matter. And I consequently find myself, at the end of this long talk, obliged to state my conclusions in an altogether personal way.... the most any one can do is to confess as candidly as he can the grounds for the faith that is in him, and leave his example to work on others as it may.

His pragmatic approach is clear here, and interesting.

​

There are three camps into which a thinker can fall on this question:

pessimistic determinism which states that all the bad and the regrettable is necessary and so the world is itself regrettable

optimistic romanticism which says that only the regret is an error, and all that seems regrettable is actually necessary and be affirmed as good

potential-based real possibility which makes sense of good and bad coming into the world and leaves a hopeful path for a better future.

​

The camp one falls into is based on how UNacceptable the thinker finds the alternatives and nothing more. There are personality revelations to be found here. No argument can prove one prejudice over another, you pick the one you pick and it reveals something about you. Do you find an ultimately irrational world which cannot be fully comprehended and predicted a monstrous proposition? then you may pick one of the first two. If you find worse the idea that good is meaningless because all is good or all is bad, then you might pick the latter.

Bridge Over River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

Face.jpg

William James

The Dilemma of Determinism

Link to downloadable PDF of "The Dilemma of Determinism"

dilemma of determinism.jpg
Bridge Over River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

William James: The Dilemma of Determinism

Face.jpg

William James

The Dilemma of Determinism

Link to downloadable PDF of "The Dilemma of Determinism"

dilemma of determinism.jpg
Hikers in Mountainous Landscape

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

H. D. Lewis: Responsibility and Absolute Choice

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H. D. Lewis

Responsibility and Absolute Choice

Link to downloadable PDF of "Collective Responsibility"

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Welsh Theologian and Philosopher

Best known for his defense of dualism and personal survival

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Monthly Readings
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TheElusiveSelf BOOK HDLewis.jpg
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worldreligions BOOK HDLewis.jpg
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TheElusiveMind BOOK HDLewis.jpg
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Read one of these books this month OR select a book for this month from one of the collection collections given in the other sections:  2, 3, 4,     6, 7, 8, 9, or 10

HDLewis Detrmiism
Hikers in Mountainous Landscape

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

H. D. Lewis: Responsibility and Absolute Choice

collective responsibility.jpg

H. D. Lewis

Responsibility and Absolute Choice

Link to downloadable PDF of "Collective Responsibility"

collective responsibility.jpg
Hikers in Mountainous Landscape

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

H. D. Lewis: Responsibility and Absolute Choice

collective responsibility.jpg

H. D. Lewis

Responsibility and Absolute Choice

Link to downloadable PDF of "Collective Responsibility"

collective responsibility.jpg

Law and Morality

Summation:

   The legal definition of "responsibility" is "subject to punishment if you cannot give a good enough account of yourself.

   But Law and Morality are not the same. It is sometimes immoral to do things which are legal; and it is sometimes moral to do things against unjust laws.

   There are three potential justifications for punishment: retributive, reformative, and deterrent. All three may have merit, but I only affirm deterrence as the only justification for punishment I find demonstrably legitimate.

 

Punishment and Freedom

Summation:

   Some go further and notice that this deterrence is justifiable even if we are determined to act the way we do by adding consequences into the calculations of determined choices.

   Some go further still and say that moral responsibility is like legal responsibility in that it is defined as opening one up to punishment.

   Here there is an error. Moral accountability is not mainly defined by relationship to punishment. "Moral responsibility is prior to punishment, and it calls for a sort of freedom which is not disclosed, but rather obscured, by easy assimilation of morality to law."

   Moral goodness and badness differs from other forms of goodness and badness.

   The "special freedom" is the difference. It is the "freedom of choice".

   Only that makes sense of the feelings of guilt or about wickedness. it hinges on the ability to have done otherwise.

​

The Areas of Absolute Choice

Summation:

   When properly moral matters are concerned we have a moment of "absolute choice". This does not mean that we can act out of character in any way at any time (a randomness and irrational absurdity which libertarians are accused of more often than they commit it). But only that there are no moral realities if there are no moments of "absolute choice" and so SOME of these moments must exist.

   We run like robots or NPCs most of the time doing what our character makes us want to do BUT in the moments when we have second-tier volitions, when we think it our duty to want something other than what we want to or act in a way other than we are inclined that moments of "absolute choice" become possible and explain moral responsibility.

   When our desires conflict we have morally significant choices to make, and these choices are between real possibilities.

   It is the "choice to make an effort" that is free. Moral worth or blame exists here in regards to the effort we make or do not make.

   But that we should continue to regard ourselves as responsible beings liable to have to make excruciating moral choices, and not merely be deciding what our preferences are, is of the utmost importance for the worth and dignity of human life as a while, and for the health of society.

   We need to believe we are responsible if we are to be healthy and have a healthy community in which to exist.

Hikers in Mountainous Landscape

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

H. D. Lewis: Responsibility and Absolute Choice

collective responsibility.jpg

H. D. Lewis

Responsibility and Absolute Choice

Link to downloadable PDF of "Collective Responsibility"

collective responsibility.jpg
Countryside Wooden House

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Stuart Mill: Of Liberty and Necessity

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John Stuart Mill

Of Liberty and Necessity

Link to downloadable PDF of this work

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One of "The Greats" -- we will return to him often

Ethicist, Philosopher of Science, Social Critic, Political Economist, Member of Parliament, Civil Servant, Theorist, Early Feminist

Perhaps most famous for having developed "Utilitarianism" an ethical theory started by Jeremy Bentham.

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Read one of these books this month OR select a book for this month from one of the collection collections given in the other sections:  2, 3, 4, 5,     7, 8, 9, or 10

John Stuart Mill DETERMINIS
Countryside Wooden House

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Monthly Readings
Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Stuart Mill: Of Liberty and Necessity

We Were Unprepared for Class This Day, Therefore:

BONUS: Conversation with Dr. Tartaglia:

Countryside Wooden House

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Monthly Readings
Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Stuart Mill: Of Liberty and Necessity

face.jpg

John Stuart Mill

Of Liberty and Necessity

Link to downloadable PDF of this work

second.jpg
Countryside Wooden House

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Stuart Mill: Of Liberty and Necessity

face.jpg

John Stuart Mill

Of Liberty and Necessity

Link to downloadable PDF of this work

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Are Human Actions Subject to the Law of Causality?

Summation:

setting the stage

    Sets up problem: Does the Law of Causality strictly apply in the same sense to human actions as to other phenomena?

    Doctrine of Necessity says "Yes--Human volitions and actions are necessary and inevitable."

    The Alternative: "No--our wills are not determined, and so are not necessary and inevitable."

declaring his side

    Mill thinks the first is correct.

identifying the problem

    The only reason people deny determinism is that they think it means something it doesn't.

opposition exists because

the supposed alternative of admitting human actions to be necessary was deemed inconsistent with everyone's instinctive consciousness, as well as humiliating to the pride, even degrading to the moral nature of man.

The opponents of Determinism oppose it for this reason; this is their motivation.

No wonder since many or MOST of the proponents of Determinism do in fact make this mistake in understanding of the consequences of their doctrine.

Mill is a kind of compatibilist.

...at least as far back as the time of Pelagious,

has divided both the philosophical and the religious world.

Countryside Wooden House

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Stuart Mill: Of Liberty and Necessity

face.jpg

John Stuart Mill

Of Liberty and Necessity

Link to downloadable PDF of this work

second.jpg

The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity

Summation:

We need a proper definition

   The doctrine entitled Philosophical Necessity is simply this: that, given the motives which are present to an individual's mind, and given likewise the character and disposition of the individual, the manner in which he will act might be unerringly inferred

   Definition: if we knew everything about a man, and all the inducements acting on his mind; we might infer his behavior as unerringly as we can predict physical events.

   This is an INTERPRETATION of universal experience, a statement in words of what everyone is internally convinced of.

   Everyone believes this. I, JSM, believe this.

   However, in NO WAY does this conflict with our feeling of freedom.

   Furthermore, we do not feel ourselves less free because those who know us well feel assured how we shall will to act in a particular case.

   Even the metaphysicians who argued that we are absolutely free in some acts have always maintained that this doctrine is consistent with divine foreknowledge of our actions.

   SO: if divine foreknowledge is compatible with our freedom, as the religious have always maintained. THEN: so is it with ANY foreknowledge.

   COMPATIBLISM: "We may be free, and yet another may have reason to be perfectly certain what use we shall make of our freedom."

   Interesting that he uses shall instead of will in that previous sentence. 

   But, most people this there IS a problem here. 

   "Cause and effect" is NOTHING MORE than "unconditional sequence".

   Mill is taking the attitude of God watching a video-screen of what will happen tomorrow and shrugging his shoulders and saying: "I didn't do any of that!"

   Just because we could, in principle, KNOW what was going to happen doesn't mean that what happens is CONSTRAINED to happen.

   People rebel against determinism because they think it means we are CONSTRAINED by our antecedents to act the way we will to. But this is a mistake made by some/most determinists and motivates the "metaphysical libertarians."

   Does the first ball MAKE the second one respond the way it does by striking it? No, says Mill.

"It would be more correct to say that matter is not bound

by necessity, than that mind is so."

Necessity is but "uniformity of order" and nothing more.

The Necessitarians mostly don't get this point. I, Mill, adhere to the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, but I understand correctly that this means that things are ORDERED and NOT ALSO that they are forced.

Countryside Wooden House

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Stuart Mill: Of Liberty and Necessity

face.jpg

John Stuart Mill

Of Liberty and Necessity

Link to downloadable PDF of this work

second.jpg

Pernicious Effect of the Term "Necessity"

Summation:

   This is all a word-association problem.

   It all boils down to the connotations of "Necessity" which are being misapplied in the realm of "causality" which is really just "regularity of sequence."

   Your feeling of a "lack of freedom" due to your acceptance of the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity is an illusion. 

   Saying that "only one thing can happen given these circumstances" is NOT to say that the circumstances FORCED the thing to happen. Fatalism can and SHOULD be rightly escaped. It is not a logical consequence of the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity.

   Similar to Lewis, and most compatibilists; Mill points out that the sum total of what we are is IN PART shaped by ourselves.

   This idea plays a larger role in some thinkers' works than in

this excerpt. To think that we have no power of altering our

character, and to think that we shall not use our power unless we

desire to use it, are very different things, and have a very different

effect on the mind. A person who does not wish to alter his

character cannot be the person who is supposed to feel discouraged

or paralyzed by thinking himself unable to do it.

   A person who is NOT striving to change their character should be unbothered by the doctrine of fatalism.

   A person who IS trying to change his own character CAN, and so he has the freedom he might fear he doesn't have through his misunderstanding of the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity.

   If you strive to change your own character BUT you believe that determinism means you can't then you will FAIL to strive to change your behavior BECAUSE OF A LIE (or because of a misunderstanding of the truth)--the truth is you CAN and often SHOULD attempt to change your character; nothing in the doctrine of necessity says you can't.

   NECESSITY as equal to "CAUSE AND EFFECT REGULARITY" is an example of ABUSE OF TERMS in philosophy, 

In short, those who agree with the idea of philosophical necessity are CORRECT, except that they misunderstand their doctrine to mean that we are unfree. the "metaphysical libertarians" are CLOSER TO THE TRUTH for this reason, even though they are wrong in denying the regularity of the world, including of the world of characters and actors.

Countryside Wooden House

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Stuart Mill: Of Liberty and Necessity

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John Stuart Mill

Of Liberty and Necessity

Link to downloadable PDF of this work

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A Motive Not Always the Anticipation of Pleasure or Pain

Summation:

    Another confusion needs to be cleared up: Motives does NOT mean "seeking to have or avoid pleasure or pain" or at least not solely.

   Even if maybe things start that way, there is an evolution where the ACTIONS themselves become the objects of desire.

   FURTHER: habit takes over and we continue to pursue the action WITHOUT any pleasure being associated with it any longer.

   This is worth noticing. MILL is saying that any SMALL amount of pleasure one might get from "having done the right thing" is FAR OUTWEIGHED by the suffering the moral hero goes through in order to do the correct action that his character has turned into a habit.

   a "habit of willing" is commonly called a "purpose". unless we have "purposes" we have no confirmed "characters" (and so we are still outside the realm of proper "moral responsibility talk").

   With those clarifications completed, Mill believes himself to have made the point that causality principles are real, but that they don't mean what we sometimes think they do, and so we are still free. and that the freedom we have does not require any metaphysical woo-woo to be real.

Countryside Wooden House

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Stuart Mill: Of Liberty and Necessity

face.jpg

John Stuart Mill

Of Liberty and Necessity

Link to downloadable PDF of this work

second.jpg
River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Monthly Readings
Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Moritz Schlick: When Is a Man Responsible?

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Moritz Schlick

When Is a Man Responsible?

Link to downloadable PDF of "Problems of Ethics", the book from which this piece was taken

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Read one of these books this month OR select a book for this month from one of the collection collections given in the other sections:  2, 3, 4, 5, 6,     8, 9, or 10

Moritz Schlick Detrminim
River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Moritz Schlick: When Is a Man Responsible?

41c8f02417715a56a29903dffe343f0c.jpg

Moritz Schlick

When Is a Man Responsible?

Link to downloadable PDF of "Problems of Ethics", the book from which this piece was taken

book.jpg
River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Moritz Schlick: When Is a Man Responsible?

41c8f02417715a56a29903dffe343f0c.jpg

Moritz Schlick

When Is a Man Responsible?

Link to downloadable PDF of "Problems of Ethics", the book from which this piece was taken

book.jpg

When is a Man Responsible?

Intro

Summation:

   The only reason this question is a problem in Ethics is because of a misunderstanding.

   The problem runs like this:

   If determinism is true, if, that is, all events obey immutable laws, then my will too is always determined, by my innate character and my motives. Hence my decisions are necessary, not free. But if so, then I am not responsible for my acts, for I would be accountable for them only if I could do something about the way my decisions went; but I can do nothing about it, since they proceed with necessity from my character and the motives. And I have made neither, and have no power over them: the motives come from without, and my character is the necessary product of the innate tendencies and the external influences which have been effective during my lifetime. Thus determinism and moral responsibility are incompatible. Moral responsibility presupposes freedom, that is, exemption from causality.

   This is all based on a confusion which runs throughout. We should expose that confusion, see how it runs through the argument; and thus destroy them.   

Two Meanings of the Word "Law"

Summation:

   The entire problem arises from this confusion: natural law and man-made laws have ONE THING and ONLY one thing in common, that they are expressed formulaically. a false equivocation occurs then from this one word. Man-made laws have compulsory elements (punishments) and are about how one SHOULD behave... Natural laws are just descriptions of the regularities of the world.

   When we say that a man's will "obeys psychological laws," these are not civic laws, which compel him to make certain decision, or dictate desires to him, which he would in fact prefer not to have. They are laws of nature, merely expressing (emphasis mine) which desires he actually has under given conditions; they describe the nature of the will in the same manner as the astronomical laws describe the nature of planets. "Compulsion" occurs where man is prevented from realizing his natural desires. How could the rule according to which these natural desires arise itself be considered as "compulsion"?

River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Moritz Schlick: When Is a Man Responsible?

41c8f02417715a56a29903dffe343f0c.jpg

Moritz Schlick

When Is a Man Responsible?

Link to downloadable PDF of "Problems of Ethics", the book from which this piece was taken

book.jpg

Compulsion and Necessity

Summation:

   This first confusion translates itself into the second. To say that something is "necessary" when talking about natural law is to say: "This rule applies in all circumstances" or to say that it is "universally valid" or "applies always". To say that behavior is necessary is to say that it is compelled. Because of the confusion of these VERY DIFFERENT ideas simply because of an equivocation in the language, we have this pseudo-problem.

Freedom and Indeterminism

Summation:

   If we could just keep clear the two ideas; we would understand that moral concerns REQUIRE us to affirm the kind of freedom of choice a man has for his decisions AND we will see NO THREAT to that idea from a "regularity of emergence" of his impulses or desires. The second does not threaten the first because they are about two completely different things.

The Nature of Responsibility

Summation:

   The Ethical question is concerned with this and ONLY this: Where is the POINT of motive. Punishment and reward (incentive and compulsion, the things of Moral Law; different and totally distinct from "regularity of causal events" which has nothing to do with the Ethical question) must be applied to the specific person who embodies the motive which leads to the action we deem worthy of reward or punishment in the hopes of deterring or incentivizing future occurrences of that event.

The Consciousness of Responsibility

Summation:

   "The feeling of responsibility means the realization that one's self, one's own psychic processes constitute the point at which motives must be applied in order to govern the acts of one's body."

   We feel guilty when we know we acted according to our own desires. this is the "consciousness of freedom".

   If we feel we could have done otherwise, then we feel guilt. THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH INDETERMINISM.

Causality as the Presupposition of Responsibility 

Summation:

   We REQUIRE that the causes of a man's behavior be reasonably determinable in order to JUSTIFY saying that he is morally responsible. The less clear his motives are, the less apt we are to blame him. Perhaps he was mad, or drugged; if the motives are EXTERNAL to himself (say, when he is compelled at the point of a gun to do something) we blame the COMPULSION and the man with the gun, not the actor. To say that "if actions "obey" a regularity of natural law then man can not be said to be responsible for his actions" is to get everything completely BACKWARDS from the truth.

   We cannot prove determinism.

   But we always assume it to do our thinking and make predictions about the world and about the behaviors of others.

   Ethics and Moral Law are about PREDICTING that a man will act less often in a certain way if he receives punishment for that action; and so it also PRESUMES a regularity and predictability of behavior. The confusion that we are not morally responsible if we are determined is due to a language equivocation.

NATURAL LAW

​

DETERMINISM (CAUSALITY)

 

(UNIVERSAL VALIDITY)

 

INDETERMINISM

​

(NO CAUSE)

LAW OF STATE

 

COMPULSION

 

(NECESSITY)

​

FREEDOM

​

(NO COMPULSION)

Don't confuse the left with its counterpart on the right; if you do so, the confusion may perpetuate downward through the chain:

River

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Moritz Schlick: When Is a Man Responsible?

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Moritz Schlick

When Is a Man Responsible?

Link to downloadable PDF of "Problems of Ethics", the book from which this piece was taken

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Wooden House in the Forest

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

C. A. Campbell: Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

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C. A. Campbell

Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

C69CCB42-761D-47F9-AF12A2A2CFF3B6F0_source.webp

Metaphysician

Monthly Readings
scepticism and construction.jpg
In defense of free will.jpg
OnSelfhood nad Godhood.jpg
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Read one of these books this month OR select a book for this month from one of the collection collections given in the other sections:  2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,      9, or 10

CACampbell Detemiis
Wooden House in the Forest

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

C. A. Campbell: Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

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C. A. Campbell

Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

C69CCB42-761D-47F9-AF12A2A2CFF3B6F0_source.webp

Metaphysician

Schlick's Account of Moral Responsibility Examined

Summation:

   Schlick denies the basic framework of the question; and he is wrong to do so.

   Further, Schlick LINKS Moral responsibility with punishment (as education) to effect future behavior which requires a kind of predictability of a person's actions and motives.

      A few problems:

         First: we don't hold animals morally responsible, but they are even more predictable in their motives and punishment for a dog causes it to act differently in the future

         Second: we say a dead man is responsible for a current state of affairs, but it makes no sense to talk of punishing him for educational reasons to effect his future behavior.

         Third: if many bad things happen to a young man during his developing years, we can conceptualize that, under Sclick's theories as "bad education" BUT we tend to hold the individual LESS morally responsible in those instances instead of more. This means that the MORE predicable a man's behavior is the LESS moral responsibility we believe he holds, at least in some instances.

Wooden House in the Forest

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

C. A. Campbell: Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

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C. A. Campbell

Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

C69CCB42-761D-47F9-AF12A2A2CFF3B6F0_source.webp

Metaphysician

Wooden House in the Forest

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

C. A. Campbell: Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

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C. A. Campbell

Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

C69CCB42-761D-47F9-AF12A2A2CFF3B6F0_source.webp

Metaphysician

"Ought" Implies "Can"

Summation:

   Those who regard this problem as a "pseudo-problem" tend to think: ' when we are trying to determine if a man is "morally responsible," we are trying to figure out if his behavior is "blameworthy." ("rightly subject to punishment")

   At least he thinks this is a part of the formula. Why is he so sure?

   If we think a man is LESS responsible if his behavior is heavily influenced by a bad upbringing; as we do. and make partial allowances for such cases; then doesn't it follow that if a man was FORCED to behave in a certain way, so that acting otherwise was IMPOSSIBLE based on a really bad upbringing, say--that he would be COMPLETELY free of blame.

   Doesn't this mean that if a man CANNOT act otherwise than he did, that we have no right to blame him?

   BUT this is precisely the situation in ALL instances if we are determined to act the way we do by our natures and by external stimulus; no bit of which do we control.

   "ought" implies "can" (the moral "ought" at least does).

   Hence if we morally blame A for not having done X, we imply that he could have done X even though in fact he did not. In other words, we imply that A could have acted otherwise than he did. And that means that we imply, as a necessary condition of a man's being morally blameworthy, that he enjoyed a freedom of a kind not compatible with unbroken causal continuity.

Wooden House in the Forest

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

C. A. Campbell: Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

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C. A. Campbell

Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

C69CCB42-761D-47F9-AF12A2A2CFF3B6F0_source.webp

Metaphysician

A Powerful Idea

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"Ought" Implies "Can"

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Wooden House in the Forest

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

C. A. Campbell: Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

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C. A. Campbell

Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

C69CCB42-761D-47F9-AF12A2A2CFF3B6F0_source.webp

Metaphysician

Wooden House in the Forest

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

C. A. Campbell: Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

440px-C.A._Campbell.png

C. A. Campbell

Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

C69CCB42-761D-47F9-AF12A2A2CFF3B6F0_source.webp

Metaphysician

The Reflective and the Unreflective Conception of Moral Responsibility

Summation:

   All of the various camps of "The free-will/determinism debate is a pseudo-problem" reason something like this:

      For moral responsibility it needs to be true that "A could have acted otherwise than he did"...

      They then conceptualize this formulation in one way or another which makes it FREE of the problem of unbroken causal continuity; and say that that is all it means and needs to mean in an ethical context.

      They then declare that a "Universal Law" of causal rule poses no problem to ethical questions of considerations of moral responsibility.

Here is how they all err:

   The truth is that a sophisticated approach to the question requires us to recognize the truth that "A could have acted otherwise" is not sufficient unless what we mean by that is "could have acted otherwise had he so chosen to do so" which means the question really remains: "Can a specific person in a specific set of circumstances REALLY AND TRULY be said to be in a position to make a choice other than the one he in fact makes?" A Universal Law of unbroken causal continuity seems to me to still pose a difficulty to this question; and so the problem is not yet solved, even if some positivists and others think they have solved it.

Wooden House in the Forest

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

C. A. Campbell: Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

440px-C.A._Campbell.png

C. A. Campbell

Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

C69CCB42-761D-47F9-AF12A2A2CFF3B6F0_source.webp

Metaphysician

Contra-Causal Freedom and Creative Activity

Summation:

   Two presuppositions posses, i speculate, the minds of those making this mistake:

  1. Positivism

  2. The conviction that no contra-causal type of freedom exists; and that this means it is not necessary to moral responsibility

    1. This second one is come to by not just adherence to a principle, but for important reasons to the moral philosopher.​

      1. if a person acted NOT out of their character, then it wouldn't be them that is responsible... so we have to affirm that men act according to their character and cannot act otherwise.​

      2. you cannot predict conduct if it comes from a break in continuity of causation​​

    2. to answer the second of these: when there is no conflict, the man's choice is SOLELY determined by his character, motives, etc... but in this case he is LESS morally responsible because there was nothing to anguish over or choose about.

The ultimate answer lies in "Second-tier" volitions (a phrase he does not use).​​

   This occurs where there are WARRING desires and duties

   If my character naturally and simply points me towards Y, but I am capable in my use of will to strive to choose X instead, then I have made a morally responsible choice worthy of blame or praise (depending on which choice I made). I simply want Y, but I will to choose X because of an argument regarding duty.

   CONCLUSION: We cannot know whether "free-will" is real or not [from this paper], but we can clarify that the impression we have that it is real comes from times when our sense of duty wars with the simple and natural inclinations of our characters.

   THEREFORE: the "problem of free-will vs. determinism" IS a real problem, and the attempts to dissolve it away are themselves confused. What we really mean to understand is that we have warring inclinations which may themselves still be determined, and which perhaps don't create together the ability to have a real freedom emerge BUT perhaps they do, and we will have to do more work to KEEP the question clear in our minds and eventually find a solution.

Wooden House in the Forest

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

C. A. Campbell: Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

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C. A. Campbell

Is "Free Will" a Pseudo-Problem?

C69CCB42-761D-47F9-AF12A2A2CFF3B6F0_source.webp

Metaphysician

Lakeside Straw Huts

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Hospers: Free Will and Psychoanalysis

John Hospers

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Free Will and Psychoanalysis

Presidential Candidate

Objectivist

Political Activist

Friend of Ayn Rand

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Monthly Readings
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libertarianism.jpg
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matita.jpg
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objectivism.jpg
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Read one of these books this month OR select a book for this month from one of the collection collections given in the other sections:  2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,      or 10

John Hospers Determinsim
Lakeside Straw Huts

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Hospers: Free Will and Psychoanalysis

John Hospers

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Free Will and Psychoanalysis

Contra-Causal Freedom and Creative Activity

Summation:

   Psychiatry shows us that your behaviors are determined by your subconscious. Your conscious merely rationalizes (comes up with stories) for why you did what you did. But the real motivation was determined by your subconscious. This is clearly seen in neurotic behaviors, as much as in epilepsy, and is true of all your behaviors.

    Suggesting that your "subconscious is also one and the same a part of you with your conscious" does nothing to help the situation since the kind of freedom people want to think they have is that their deliberative conscious self is making their decisions; but psychiatry shows us this isn't true.

    Even the actions one performs "voluntarily and with premeditation" are the result of invisible (to the consciousness of the actor) strings from the subconscious.

    "Big three behind the scenes" = id, ego, and super-ego; they determine all.

    Philosophers have no problem accepting that in certain neurotic cases (kleptomania, schizophrenia) the individual is NOT FREE, but is a slave to their subconscious. The science of psychiatry has taught the psychiatrist (though the philosopher has yet to catch up) that this is also the case in all people at all times. 

Lakeside Straw Huts

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Hospers: Free Will and Psychoanalysis

John Hospers

face.jpg

Free Will and Psychoanalysis

Contra-Causal Freedom and Creative Activity

Summation continued:

​

In Deductive Form:

  1. An occurrence over which we had no control is something we cannot be held responsible for.

  2. Events E, occurring during our babyhood, were events over which we had no control.

  3. Therefore events E were events which we cannot be held responsible for.

  4. But if there is something we cannot be held responsible for, neither can we be held responsible for something that inevitably results from it.

  5. Events E have as inevitable consequence Neurosis N, which in turn has as inevitable consequence Behavior B.

  6. Since N is the inevitable consequence of E; and B is the inevitable consequence of N, B is the inevitable consequence of E.

  7. Hence, Not being responsible for E, we cannot be responsible for B.

​

    Schlick says: "you are free when there are no outside forces making you act."

* if we use this definition, then sure; we are often free.

    If, however, we take into account compulsion from UNCONSCIOUS INTERNAL FORCES, then the question changes.

* Some psychologists would say that there are DEGREES of freedom. You are free to the degree that neurosis isn't controlling you.

    However, psychoanalysts know that ALL behavior (good or bad, healthy or neurotic) is rooted in the subconscious.

* This means that the LARGE PORTION of your behaviors are not really free at all; only when you are emotionally disconnected (when your behaviors have no real ties to anything important to you) are you maybe a little free.   

Lakeside Straw Huts

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Hospers: Free Will and Psychoanalysis

John Hospers

face.jpg

Free Will and Psychoanalysis

Lakeside Straw Huts

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

John Hospers: Free Will and Psychoanalysis

John Hospers

face.jpg

Free Will and Psychoanalysis

Reflection in a Pond

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

S.I. Benn & R.S. Peters: Human Action and the Limitations of Causal Explanation

Monthly Readings
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Read one of these books this month OR select a book for this month from one of the collection collections given in the other sections:  2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 

SIBennRSPeters Determinim
Reflection in a Pond

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

S.I. Benn & R.S. Peters: Human Action and the Limitations of Causal Explanation

Human Action and the Limitations of Causal Explanation

​

  1. For a scientific explanation to be a complete explanation (necessary AND sufficient); there can be no norms involved.

  2. logical deliberations have a normative element.

  3. Therefore, science cannot fully explain (or explain away) behaviors that result from logical deliberations.

​

People can LEARN about the supposed explanations of their actions, take them into account, and by this process become less-predictable.

​

Science may give us many things which have to happen when we make a decision. BUT, a "sufficient explanation would have to take account of the reasons for his actions."

​

When people behave irrationally, we look for external causes.

When people behave rationally, we do not.

Because we can find external causes for irrational behavior, we think the causes are external.

We make a mistake when we think that rational behavior is also caused externally because we do not remember that there is a normative element to rational behavior, and so no such explanation could be complete.

​

You can only be free when you do things deliberately. This is because CAUSAL explanations are inappropriate to use when trying to understand why a man acts "according to a rule" (normatively).

​

TWO OBJECTIONS:

1. aren't we subject to causes either way?

Answer: Different kind of "Causes" these are "self-determinations" (See Spinoza and Kant). external causes force you, you "seeing the reason to utilize strategy A vs. B to achieve your end goal" is not a "cause" even if the reason for using A is to get to the goal.

2. maybe reasons are just rationalizations, what about what Hospers said.

Answer: "rationalizations" is a term that cannot exist except in contradistinction to "real reasons" so the use of the term implies that real reasons can exist.

Reflection in a Pond

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

S.I. Benn & R.S. Peters: Human Action and the Limitations of Causal Explanation

NOTE TO SELF:

​

to continue this section:

Talk about philosophy of mind notion of phenomenological "riding on top of" physical underpinnings.

​

Talk about "normative" and what it means in this essay.

Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

General

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Contain Great Bibliographies

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Contains a Valuable and Very Balanced discussion of all the main arguments on both sides of the Indeterminism debate.

Briefer

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More Readable

Older Works

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Covering Same Territory

Historical Survey

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Live Link

Book 4; Ch. XI (see pg. 396)

FurterReadin Determiism
Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Anthologies

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Collections of Essays

devoted entirely to the subject

of free will and determinism

and its numerous ramifications.

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Original Collections

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Multiple Contributors Debating These Topics in Each Work

Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Human Action Anthologies

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Contain Sections

About Determinism and Free Will

Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Philosophy General

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General Introductions to Philosophy

Discuss in some detail these questions.

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Collection

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Collected Papers on Freedom and Responsibility by Contemporary Theologians

Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Compatibilists ("Soft Determinists" or "Reconcilers")

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Idealist Compatibilists

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Hard Determinists

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Indeterminists

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Sartre's Extreme and Somewhat Obscure Indeterminism

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Other Existentialist Indeterminism

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

William Jamesian Indeterminists

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Discussions of Karl Popperian Indeterminism

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Popper

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Criticism

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Another Philosophy of Science Defense of Indeterminism

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Anti-chance Indeterminists

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Determinism is Self-Contradictory

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Quantum Theory and Indeterminacy

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Catholic Opposition to Determinism

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Psychoanalytic Determinism

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Rational-Action-Based Liberty

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Unpredictable Decisions Are Uncaused

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

"could have done otherwise" statements

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Causal Principle is Meaningless

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Attacks on Volition and Willing

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Unclassifiable Articles

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

Other

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Wild Icelandic Horses

Introduction to Academic Philosophy

Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility

Further Readings

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Encyclopedic

"Can"

"Causation"

"Chance"

"Choosing, Deciding, and Doing"

"Determinism"

"Determinism in History"

"Guilt"

"Must"

"Punishment"

"Reasons and Causes"

"Responsibility, Moral and Legal"

"Self-Prediction"

"Volition"

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Meaning
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