Philosophy of Mind

Souls, AI, Neuroscience, Qualia, Psyche, and more.

Philosophy of Mind -- Contents

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Historical Background

Artificial Intelligence

Syllabus

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Historical Background

1. Souls and Bodies
-- Plato
2. The Soul as Bodily Organization
-- Aristotle
3. Minds and Bodies as Distinct Substances
-- René Descartes
4. Matter and Thought
-- John Locke

Historical Background

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity

Historical Background

1. Souls and Bodies
-- Plato
2. The Soul as Bodily Organization
-- Aristotle
3. Minds and Bodies as Distinct Substances
-- René Descartes
4. Matter and Thought
-- John Locke

Readings for this Class

Full Text of PHAEDO

01 Plato Souls and Bodies

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity

Historical Background

1. Souls and Bodies
-- Plato
2. The Soul as Bodily Organization
-- Aristotle
3. Minds and Bodies as Distinct Substances
-- René Descartes
4. Matter and Thought
-- John Locke

02 Aristotle The Soul as Bodily Organization

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity

Historical Background

1. Souls and Bodies
-- Plato
2. The Soul as Bodily Organization
-- Aristotle
3. Minds and Bodies as Distinct Substances
-- René Descartes
4. Matter and Thought
-- John Locke

03 DesCartes Mind and Bodies

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity

Historical Background

1. Souls and Bodies
-- Plato
2. The Soul as Bodily Organization
-- Aristotle
3. Minds and Bodies as Distinct Substances
-- René Descartes
4. Matter and Thought
-- John Locke

04 John Locke Matter and Thought

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Behaviorism and mind-brain identity

5. The Logical Analysis of Psychology
-- Carl Hempel
6. Brains and Behaviour
-- Hilary Putnam
7. Mind and Body
-- R.J. Hirst
8. Sensations and Brain Processes
-- J.J.C. Smart
9. Identity and Necessity
-- Saul A. Kripke

Behaviorism and Mind-Brain Identity

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism

Behaviorism and mind-brain identity

5. The Logical Analysis of Psychology
-- Carl Hempel
6. Brains and Behaviour
-- Hilary Putnam
7. Mind and Body
-- R.J. Hirst
8. Sensations and Brain Processes
-- J.J.C. Smart
9. Identity and Necessity
-- Saul A. Kripke

05 Carl Hempel

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism

Behaviorism and mind-brain identity

5. The Logical Analysis of Psychology
-- Carl Hempel
6. Brains and Behaviour
-- Hilary Putnam
7. Mind and Body
-- R.J. Hirst
8. Sensations and Brain Processes
-- J.J.C. Smart
9. Identity and Necessity
-- Saul A. Kripke

06 Hilary Putnam

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism

Behaviorism and mind-brain identity

5. The Logical Analysis of Psychology
-- Carl Hempel
6. Brains and Behaviour
-- Hilary Putnam
7. Mind and Body
-- R.J. Hirst
8. Sensations and Brain Processes
-- J.J.C. Smart
9. Identity and Necessity
-- Saul A. Kripke

07 RJ Hirst

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism

Behaviorism and mind-brain identity

5. The Logical Analysis of Psychology
-- Carl Hempel
6. Brains and Behaviour
-- Hilary Putnam
7. Mind and Body
-- R.J. Hirst
8. Sensations and Brain Processes
-- J.J.C. Smart
9. Identity and Necessity
-- Saul A. Kripke

08 JJC Smart

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism

Behaviorism and mind-brain identity

5. The Logical Analysis of Psychology
-- Carl Hempel
6. Brains and Behaviour
-- Hilary Putnam
7. Mind and Body
-- R.J. Hirst
8. Sensations and Brain Processes
-- J.J.C. Smart
9. Identity and Necessity
-- Saul A. Kripke

09 Saul A Kripke

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Functionalism

10. An Argument for the Identity Theory
-- David Lewis
11. Psychological Predicates
-- Hilary Putnam
12. The Mind-Body Problem
-- Jerry Fodor
13. What is Functionalism
-- Ned Block

Functionalism

Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence

Functionalism

10. An Argument for the Identity Theory
-- David Lewis
11. Psychological Predicates
-- Hilary Putnam
12. The Mind-Body Problem
-- Jerry Fodor
13. What is Functionalism
-- Ned Block

10 David Lewis

Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence

Functionalism

10. An Argument for the Identity Theory
-- David Lewis
11. Psychological Predicates
-- Hilary Putnam
12. The Mind-Body Problem
-- Jerry Fodor
13. What is Functionalism
-- Ned Block

11 Hilary Putnam

Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence

Functionalism

10. An Argument for the Identity Theory
-- David Lewis
11. Psychological Predicates
-- Hilary Putnam
12. The Mind-Body Problem
-- Jerry Fodor
13. What is Functionalism
-- Ned Block

12 Jerry Fodor

Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence

Functionalism

10. An Argument for the Identity Theory
-- David Lewis
11. Psychological Predicates
-- Hilary Putnam
12. The Mind-Body Problem
-- Jerry Fodor
13. What is Functionalism
-- Ned Block

13 Ned Block

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Artificial Intelligence

14.Computing Machinery and Intelligence
-- Alan M. Turing
15. Minds, Brains, and Programs
-- John R. Searle
16. Escaping from the Chinese Room
-- Margaret A. Boden
17. The Mind as Software in the Brain
-- Ned Block

Artificial Intelligence

Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism

Artificial Intelligence

14.Computing Machinery and Intelligence
-- Alan M. Turing
15. Minds, Brains, and Programs
-- John R. Searle
16. Escaping from the Chinese Room
-- Margaret A. Boden
17. The Mind as Software in the Brain
-- Ned Block

14 Alan Turing

Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism

Artificial Intelligence

14.Computing Machinery and Intelligence
-- Alan M. Turing
15. Minds, Brains, and Programs
-- John R. Searle
16. Escaping from the Chinese Room
-- Margaret A. Boden
17. The Mind as Software in the Brain
-- Ned Block

15 John R Searle

Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism

Artificial Intelligence

14.Computing Machinery and Intelligence
-- Alan M. Turing
15. Minds, Brains, and Programs
-- John R. Searle
16. Escaping from the Chinese Room
-- Margaret A. Boden
17. The Mind as Software in the Brain
-- Ned Block

16 Margaret A Boden

Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism

Artificial Intelligence

14.Computing Machinery and Intelligence
-- Alan M. Turing
15. Minds, Brains, and Programs
-- John R. Searle
16. Escaping from the Chinese Room
-- Margaret A. Boden
17. The Mind as Software in the Brain
-- Ned Block

17 Ned Block

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Interpretationism

18. Radical Interpretation
-- Donald Davidson
19. Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology
-- Daniel Dennett
20. Thought and Talk
-- Donald Davidson
21. Replication and Functionalism
-- Jane Heal

Interpretationism

Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism

Interpretationism

18. Radical Interpretation
-- Donald Davidson
19. Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology
-- Daniel Dennett
20. Thought and Talk
-- Donald Davidson
21. Replication and Functionalism
-- Jane Heal

18 Donald Davidson

Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism

Interpretationism

18. Radical Interpretation
-- Donald Davidson
19. Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology
-- Daniel Dennett
20. Thought and Talk
-- Donald Davidson
21. Replication and Functionalism
-- Jane Heal

19 Daniel Dennett

Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism

Interpretationism

18. Radical Interpretation
-- Donald Davidson
19. Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology
-- Daniel Dennett
20. Thought and Talk
-- Donald Davidson
21. Replication and Functionalism
-- Jane Heal

20 Donald Davidson

Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism

Interpretationism

18. Radical Interpretation
-- Donald Davidson
19. Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology
-- Daniel Dennett
20. Thought and Talk
-- Donald Davidson
21. Replication and Functionalism
-- Jane Heal

21 Jane Heal

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Eliminativism

22. Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis
-- Stephen P. Stich
23. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
-- Paul Churchland
24. Cognitive Suicide
-- Lynne Rudder Baker

Elimiativism

Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content

Eliminativism

22. Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis
-- Stephen P. Stich
23. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
-- Paul Churchland
24. Cognitive Suicide
-- Lynne Rudder Baker

22 Stephen P Stich

Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content

Eliminativism

22. Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis
-- Stephen P. Stich
23. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
-- Paul Churchland
24. Cognitive Suicide
-- Lynne Rudder Baker

23 Paul Churchland

Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content

Eliminativism

22. Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis
-- Stephen P. Stich
23. Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes
-- Paul Churchland
24. Cognitive Suicide
-- Lynne Rudder Baker

24 Lynne Rudder Baker

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Externalism and Mental Content

25. Individualism and the Mental
-- Tyler Burge
26. Brains in a Vat
-- Hilary Putnam
27. Are We Brains in a Vat
-- John Heil
28. Mental Content
-- Jaegwon Kim

Externalism and Mental Content

Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge

Externalism and Mental Content

25. Individualism and the Mental
-- Tyler Burge
26. Brains in a Vat
-- Hilary Putnam
27. Are We Brains in a Vat
-- John Heil
28. Mental Content
-- Jaegwon Kim

25 Tyler Burge

Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge

Externalism and Mental Content

25. Individualism and the Mental
-- Tyler Burge
26. Brains in a Vat
-- Hilary Putnam
27. Are We Brains in a Vat
-- John Heil
28. Mental Content
-- Jaegwon Kim

26 Hilary Putnam

Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge

Externalism and Mental Content

25. Individualism and the Mental
-- Tyler Burge
26. Brains in a Vat
-- Hilary Putnam
27. Are We Brains in a Vat
-- John Heil
28. Mental Content
-- Jaegwon Kim

27 John Heil

Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge

Externalism and Mental Content

25. Individualism and the Mental
-- Tyler Burge
26. Brains in a Vat
-- Hilary Putnam
27. Are We Brains in a Vat
-- John Heil
28. Mental Content
-- Jaegwon Kim

28 Jaegwon Kim

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge

29. What Is it like to Be a Bat
-- Thomas Nagel
30. Could Love Be like a Heatwave?
-- Janet Levin
31. Knowing One's Own Mind
-- Donald Davidson
32. Individualism and Self-Knowledge
-- Tyler Burge
33. Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access
-- Michael McKinsey

Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge

Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness

Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge

29. What Is it like to Be a Bat
-- Thomas Nagel
30. Could Love Be like a Heatwave?
-- Janet Levin
31. Knowing One's Own Mind
-- Donald Davidson
32. Individualism and Self-Knowledge
-- Tyler Burge
33. Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access
-- Michael McKinsey

29 Thomas Nagel

Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness

Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge

29. What Is it like to Be a Bat
-- Thomas Nagel
30. Could Love Be like a Heatwave?
-- Janet Levin
31. Knowing One's Own Mind
-- Donald Davidson
32. Individualism and Self-Knowledge
-- Tyler Burge
33. Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access
-- Michael McKinsey

30 Janet Levin

Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness

Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge

29. What Is it like to Be a Bat
-- Thomas Nagel
30. Could Love Be like a Heatwave?
-- Janet Levin
31. Knowing One's Own Mind
-- Donald Davidson
32. Individualism and Self-Knowledge
-- Tyler Burge
33. Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access
-- Michael McKinsey

31 Donald Davidson

Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness

Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge

29. What Is it like to Be a Bat
-- Thomas Nagel
30. Could Love Be like a Heatwave?
-- Janet Levin
31. Knowing One's Own Mind
-- Donald Davidson
32. Individualism and Self-Knowledge
-- Tyler Burge
33. Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access
-- Michael McKinsey

32 Tyler Burge

Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness

Subjectivity and Self-Knowledge

29. What Is it like to Be a Bat
-- Thomas Nagel
30. Could Love Be like a Heatwave?
-- Janet Levin
31. Knowing One's Own Mind
-- Donald Davidson
32. Individualism and Self-Knowledge
-- Tyler Burge
33. Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access
-- Michael McKinsey

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Consciousness

34. What Is Consciousness?
-- D.M. Armstrong
35. Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness
-- David J. Chalmers
36. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
-- Gilbert Harman
37. Précis of Ten Problems of Consciousness
-- Michael Tye
38. Is Experiencing Just Representing?
-- Ned Block

Consciousness

33 Michael McKinsey

Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction

Consciousness

34. What Is Consciousness?
-- D.M. Armstrong
35. Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness
-- David J. Chalmers
36. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
-- Gilbert Harman
37. Précis of Ten Problems of Consciousness
-- Michael Tye
38. Is Experiencing Just Representing?
-- Ned Block

34 DM Armstrong

Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction

Consciousness

34. What Is Consciousness?
-- D.M. Armstrong
35. Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness
-- David J. Chalmers
36. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
-- Gilbert Harman
37. Précis of Ten Problems of Consciousness
-- Michael Tye
38. Is Experiencing Just Representing?
-- Ned Block

35 David J Chalmers

Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction

Consciousness

34. What Is Consciousness?
-- D.M. Armstrong
35. Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness
-- David J. Chalmers
36. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
-- Gilbert Harman
37. Précis of Ten Problems of Consciousness
-- Michael Tye
38. Is Experiencing Just Representing?
-- Ned Block

36 Gilbert Harman

Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction

Consciousness

34. What Is Consciousness?
-- D.M. Armstrong
35. Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness
-- David J. Chalmers
36. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
-- Gilbert Harman
37. Précis of Ten Problems of Consciousness
-- Michael Tye
38. Is Experiencing Just Representing?
-- Ned Block

37 Michael Tye

Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction

Consciousness

34. What Is Consciousness?
-- D.M. Armstrong
35. Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness
-- David J. Chalmers
36. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience
-- Gilbert Harman
37. Précis of Ten Problems of Consciousness
-- Michael Tye
38. Is Experiencing Just Representing?
-- Ned Block

38 Ned Block

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Reduction

39. Mental Events
-- Donald Davidson
40. The Irreducibility of Consciousness
-- John R. Searle
41. The Metaphysics of Irreducibility
-- Derk Pereboom and Hilary Kornblith
42. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction
-- Jaegwon Kim

Reduction

Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?

Reduction

39. Mental Events
-- Donald Davidson
40. The Irreducibility of Consciousness
-- John R. Searle
41. The Metaphysics of Irreducibility
-- Derk Pereboom and Hilary Kornblith
42. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction
-- Jaegwon Kim

39 Donald Davidson

Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?

Reduction

39. Mental Events
-- Donald Davidson
40. The Irreducibility of Consciousness
-- John R. Searle
41. The Metaphysics of Irreducibility
-- Derk Pereboom and Hilary Kornblith
42. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction
-- Jaegwon Kim

40 John R Searle

Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?

Reduction

39. Mental Events
-- Donald Davidson
40. The Irreducibility of Consciousness
-- John R. Searle
41. The Metaphysics of Irreducibility
-- Derk Pereboom and Hilary Kornblith
42. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction
-- Jaegwon Kim

41 Derk Pereboom and Hilar Kornblith

Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?

Reduction

39. Mental Events
-- Donald Davidson
40. The Irreducibility of Consciousness
-- John R. Searle
41. The Metaphysics of Irreducibility
-- Derk Pereboom and Hilary Kornblith
42. Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction
-- Jaegwon Kim

42 Jaegwon Kim

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Is the Mind-Body Problem Insoluble?

43. Epiphenomenal Qualia
-- Frank Jackson
44. Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
-- Joseph Levine
45. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?
-- Colin McGinn
46. The Why of Consciousness: A Non-Issue for Materialists
-- Valerie Gray Hardcastle

Is the Mind-Body Problem Insoluble?

Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Is the Mind-Body Problem Insoluble?

43. Epiphenomenal Qualia
-- Frank Jackson
44. Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
-- Joseph Levine
45. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?
-- Colin McGinn
46. The Why of Consciousness: A Non-Issue for Materialists
-- Valerie Gray Hardcastle

43 Frank Jackson

Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Is the Mind-Body Problem Insoluble?

43. Epiphenomenal Qualia
-- Frank Jackson
44. Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
-- Joseph Levine
45. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?
-- Colin McGinn
46. The Why of Consciousness: A Non-Issue for Materialists
-- Valerie Gray Hardcastle

44 Joseph Levine

Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Is the Mind-Body Problem Insoluble?

43. Epiphenomenal Qualia
-- Frank Jackson
44. Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
-- Joseph Levine
45. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?
-- Colin McGinn
46. The Why of Consciousness: A Non-Issue for Materialists
-- Valerie Gray Hardcastle

45 Coln McGinn

Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Is the Mind-Body Problem Insoluble?

43. Epiphenomenal Qualia
-- Frank Jackson
44. Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap
-- Joseph Levine
45. Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?
-- Colin McGinn
46. The Why of Consciousness: A Non-Issue for Materialists
-- Valerie Gray Hardcastle

46 Valerie Gray Hardcastle

Philosophy of Mind: Contents

Part I: Historical Background
Part II: Behaviorism and mind-brain identity
Part III: Functionalism
Part IV: Artificial Intelligence
Part V: Interpretationism
Part VI: Eliminativism
Part VII: Externalism and mental content
Part VIII: Subjectivity and self-knowledge
Part IX: Consciousness
Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Challenges to Contemporary Materialism

47. The Succinct Case for Idealism
-- John Foster
48. Difficulties with Physicalism, and a Programme for Dualists
-- Peter Forrest
49. Non-Cartesian Dualism
-- E.J. Lowe
50. Remarks on the Mind-Body Problem
-- E. Wigner

Challenges to Contemporary Materialism

Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Challenges to Contemporary Materialism

47. The Succinct Case for Idealism
-- John Foster
48. Difficulties with Physicalism, and a Programme for Dualists
-- Peter Forrest
49. Non-Cartesian Dualism
-- E.J. Lowe
50. Remarks on the Mind-Body Problem
-- E. Wigner

47 John Foster

Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Challenges to Contemporary Materialism

47. The Succinct Case for Idealism
-- John Foster
48. Difficulties with Physicalism, and a Programme for Dualists
-- Peter Forrest
49. Non-Cartesian Dualism
-- E.J. Lowe
50. Remarks on the Mind-Body Problem
-- E. Wigner

48 Peter Forrest

Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Challenges to Contemporary Materialism

47. The Succinct Case for Idealism
-- John Foster
48. Difficulties with Physicalism, and a Programme for Dualists
-- Peter Forrest
49. Non-Cartesian Dualism
-- E.J. Lowe
50. Remarks on the Mind-Body Problem
-- E. Wigner

49 EJ Lowe

Part X: Reduction
Part XI: Is the mind-body problem insoluble?
Part XII: Challenges to contemporary materialism

Challenges to Contemporary Materialism

47. The Succinct Case for Idealism
-- John Foster
48. Difficulties with Physicalism, and a Programme for Dualists
-- Peter Forrest
49. Non-Cartesian Dualism
-- E.J. Lowe
50. Remarks on the Mind-Body Problem
-- E. Wigner

50 E Wigner